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Abstract 
David Rosenthal explains conscious mentality in terms of two independent, though complementary, 
theories—the higher-order thought (“HOT”) theory of consciousness and quality-space theory 
(“QST”) about mental qualities. It is natural to understand this combination of views as constituting 
a kind of representationalism about experience—that is, a version of the view that an experience’s 
conscious character is identical with certain of its representational properties. At times, however, 
Rosenthal seems to resist this characterization of his view. We explore here whether and to what 
extent it makes sense to construe Rosenthal’s views as representationalist. Our goal is not merely 
terminological—discerning how best to use the expression ‘representationalism’. Rather, we argue 
that understanding Rosenthal’s account as a kind of representationalism permits us not only to make 
sense of broader debates within the philosophy of mind, but also to extend and clarify aspects of the 
view itself. 
 
“The appearances of consciousness reflect the contents of our 
HOTs; what it’s like for one to be in a particular mental state is a 
matter of how one’s HOT represents that state.”  
– David Rosenthal, Consciousness and Mind, p. 14 
 
1. Introduction 
Throughout his impressive body of work, David Rosenthal (e.g., 1986; 1991; 2005; 2010; 2012; 
2019) explains experience in terms of two independent, though complementary, theories—his 
higher-order thought (“HOT”) theory of consciousness and what he calls ‘quality-space theory’ 
(“QST”) about mental qualities. 
According to Rosenthal’s HOT theory, a mental state is conscious just in case one is aware 
of being in that state via a suitable HOT (for related versions of HOT theory, see, e.g., Weisberg 
2011a; Brown 2012; 2015). To consciously see red is to be aware of oneself as seeing red via a 
suitable HOT. On QST, the qualities of mental states such as perceptual or emotional states can be 
understood in terms of their locations within spaces that match the quality spaces of the perceptible 
properties to which they correspond (for similar views, see, e.g., Shoemaker 1975; Clark 1993). 
Rosenthal, like many in the history of philosophy, distinguishes perceptible properties—the 
perceptible colors, odors, shapes, and so forth of mind-independent objects—from their 
corresponding mental qualities—the colors, odors, shapes, and so on that characterize qualitative 
mental states (e.g., Reid 1785/1969, p. 244; Peacocke 1983, pp. 20-21). According to QST, the 
reddish quality of a visual perception of red—what Rosenthal calls ‘mental red’—is a property that 
occupies a location within the space of mental-color qualities that corresponds to the location of the 
perceptible-color red within the quality space of perceptible colors. On this combination of views, 
then, what it is to consciously see red is, more specifically, to be aware of oneself via a suitable HOT 
as being in a visual state that exhibits mental red. 
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HOTs are a kind of thought—that is, a kind of mental representation. And, as we shall see, 
Rosenthal proposes that mental qualities too represent their corresponding perceptible properties. It 
is thus natural, as many do (e.g., Gennaro 2018; Lycan 2019), to read Rosenthal’s combination of 
views as constituting a kind of representationalism about experience—the view that an experience’s 
conscious character is identical with certain of its representational properties (for other versions of 
representationalism, see, e.g., Harman 1990; Dretske 1995).1 Representationalism is attractive for 
many reasons. It would seem, for example, that there can be no changes in perceptual 
phenomenology—that is, how things consciously seem to us—without there being changes in how 
we represent things as being, which suggests that the character of experience at least depends on 
representational properties (e.g., Byrne 2001). 
In general, theories of consciousness come in two broad varieties: higher-order (“HO”) 
theories—of which HOT theory is a variant—which explain conscious mentality in terms of some 
kind of HO awareness (e.g., Armstrong 1968; Lycan 1996) and first-order (“FO”) theories, which 
reject that conscious mentality constitutively involves any kind of HO awareness and instead locate 
consciousness in various properties of FO mental states (e.g., Dehaene et al 2006; Block 2007). 
Representationalism would seem to be able to come in both FO and HO varieties—and many 
assume that Rosenthal’s views are a version of the latter. 
But whether or not Rosenthal’s views are representationalist is far from straightforward. For 
one thing, standard FO theories typically do not distinguish mental qualities and consciousness, 
maintaining that mental qualities simply are the features of mental states in virtue of which they are 
conscious. Such necessarily conscious mental qualities are often called ‘qualia’, ‘phenomenal 
properties’, and the like (e.g., Nagel 1974; Block 2007). According to standard versions of FO 
representationalism, for example, having the right kind of FO representation suffices for one to 
have qualia or a phenomenal experience (e.g., Dretske 1995; Tye 2000). A visual experience of red, 
on such a view, consists in one’s suitably representing perceptible red. But since there is much 
evidence that mental states such as perceptual states can occur without being conscious, as in studies 
involving masked priming or pathological conditions such as blindsight (see respectively, e.g., 
Kouider & Dehaene 2007; Weiskrantz 1997), Rosenthal separates mental qualities from 
consciousness insofar as he holds that the former can and do occur without the latter. He thus 
develops independent theories of mental qualities and consciousness. 
We can thus ask: is it reasonable to understand Rosenthal as a representationalist about 
consciousness, mental qualities, neither, or both? At times, Rosenthal seems to resist characterizing 
any aspect of his thinking as representationalist (see, e.g., 2005, p. 223; 2019, p. 54). Our goal here, 
however, is to argue that Rosenthal’s views can and should be read as a (unique) kind of 
representationalism. But our purpose is not merely terminological—discerning how best to use the 
expression ‘representationalism’. Rather, we argue that understanding Rosenthal’s views in this way 
permits us not only to make sense of broader debates within the philosophy of mind, but also to 
extend and clarify aspects of his accounts themselves. 
 We begin in section 2 by exploring whether and how we may read HOT theory as a 
representationalism about consciousness. Then, in section 3, we clarify what kind of 
representationalism this theory constitutes. In section 4, we lay out basic features of QST, arguing 
that it is most naturally construed as a theory of a kind of mental content. Several objections to and 
questions about this proposal remain, however, which we explore in section 5. We conclude that the 
combination of QST and HOT theory is best understood as a kind of HO representationalism, 
involving representations of representations. 	
1 Representationalism is often referred to by other names, such as ‘intentionalism’ or ‘representationism’—though as we 
shall see, there are reasons to prefer ‘representationalism’. 
	Page 3 of 15 
 
2. HOT Theory and Representationalism 
To assess whether or not Rosenthal’s views are genuinely representationalist, it is first necessary to 
clarify how we understand representationalism in general. There are various ways to formulate the 
basic commitments of the view (for a taxonomy of kinds of representationalism, see, e.g., Chalmers 
2010, chapter 11), but we follow Seager and Bourget, who offer what they call the ‘Exhaustion 
Thesis’ as the defining element of what they call ‘modern representationalism’: 
 
The claim is that a state’s phenomenal character is exhausted by its content. The exact meaning of the 
exhaustion thesis is that for every phenomenal character P there is some content C such that a state with P is 
nothing more than a phenomenal state with content C (2017, p. 274). 
 
Here ‘phenomenal character’ picks out, to use Nagel’s (1974) expression, what it is like for the subject 
of the experience. As we and many others understand the expression ‘content’, it is just a condition 
of satisfaction (e.g., Chalmers 2010, pp. 341-342). The Exhaustion Thesis thus holds that what it is 
like for a subject to visually experience red is the state’s satisfaction conditions—the property of 
representing things in a certain way. Again, this thesis is quite broad and representationalism is 
thereby contrasted with versions of qualia realism, according to which consciousness consists in 
nonrepresentational introspectively manifest qualia (e.g., Block 2007), or naïve realism, on which at 
least perceptual consciousness is not fundamentally explained in terms of representation, but in 
terms of relations between perceivers and perceived objects (e.g., Brewer 2011).  
We note that Rosenthal tends to eschew using ‘qualia’, ‘phenomenal consciousness’, and 
related expressions, instead casting his views as a theory of what he calls ‘(qualitative) state 
consciousness’. Rosenthal seems to regard the former expressions as tacitly assuming from the 
outset that we cannot separate consciousness from mental qualities (e.g., Rosenthal 2011, p. 434). 
But we take ‘phenomenal consciousness’ and related expressions to pick out a theory-neutral 
phenomenon—what we might simply call ‘experience’ (see, e.g., Weisberg 2011b; Chalmers 2015).2  
Indeed, qualitative state consciousness and phenomenal consciousness would seem to 
coincide, at least in the case of perceptual consciousness.3 To see why, consider the fact that one of 
the main motivations for HOT theory is the commonsense observation that if one is in a mental 
state, but in no way aware of being in it, then that mental state is not conscious—or, equivalently, 
one is not having an experience. But the contrapositive claim, which Rosenthal (e.g., 2005, p. 4) calls 
the ‘Transitivity Principle’ (“TP”), is that one is in a conscious mental state or has an experience only 
if one is somehow aware of oneself as being in a mental state. In other words, it is enshrined in 
commonsense psychology that consciousness is, as Rosenthal (e.g., 2011, p. 431) often puts it, a 
matter of mental appearance—the way in which one’s own mental life subjectively appears to oneself. 
And HOT theory hypothesizes that the best explanation of this kind of inner awareness is provided 
by thoughts of a particular kind: ordinary occurrent assertoric thoughts with contents of the form “I 
see red” or “I think that Paris is in France.” 
HOT theory is arguably an account of phenomenal consciousness insofar the TP can be 
construed in terms of it. If one is in a mental state, but in no way aware of being in it, then there is 
nothing that it is like for one to be in that state; this is simply equivalent to the claim that one has a 
phenomenal experience only if one is somehow aware of oneself as being in a qualitative state. And 	
2 Since we use ‘experience’ to refer only to conscious states, we take expressions such as ‘conscious experience’ to be 
redundant. 
3 Since Rosenthal maintains that cognitive states such as thoughts can also be conscious when one has suitable HOTs 
that one is in such states, there are arguably cases of so-called ‘cognitive phenomenology’ or phenomenal consciousness 
that are not qualitative (see, e.g., Brown & Mandik 2012). 
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this usage of ‘phenomenal experience’ is compatible with the existence of unconscious mental 
qualities as Rosenthal understands them.4 
 Why regard HOT theory as a kind of representationalism? In short, because Rosenthal urges 
that suitable HOTs on their own engender phenomenology—that is, suitable HOTs are both 
necessary and sufficient for experience. If consciousness is a matter of mental appearance—and 
appearances in general can be inaccurate—then the theory is compatible with cases of so-called 
‘empty’ or ‘targetless’ HOTs, wherein one has a suitable HOT that renders one aware of oneself as 
being in states that one is in fact not in. The theory does not rule out that one can visually 
experience red insofar as one has the suitable HOT that one sees red, but not actually see red insofar 
as one is not in any relevant FO state that represents red in the environment.  
The possibility of targetless HOTs has appeared to many critics of the theory to be not 
simply implausible, but to pose a fatal problem for the view (e.g., Neander 1998; Block 2011). But 
such HOTs should be expected so long as we recognize that consciousness is a matter of mental 
appearance. Though many theorists have denied that there is or could be an appearance/reality gap 
for the mind (e.g., Nagel, 1974, p. 174), there would seem to be no good reason to assume that, as 
Rosenthal has persuasively argued (e.g., 2005, pp. 43ff).  
HOT theory thus does not conceive of consciousness as a property that HOTs somehow 
transfer to actually existing FO states (e.g., Rosenthal 2005, p. 185). Some interpret HOT theory 
along these lines (e.g., Wilberg 2010; Gennaro 2012); Brown (2012) calls these ‘relational’ 
interpretations of the view. But relational versions of HOT theory are distinct from Rosenthal’s own 
view, which Brown (2012) dubs the ‘nonrelational’ version. And relational versions are questionable 
for several reasons (see, e.g., Berger 2014; Pereplyotchik 2015). For one thing, it is hard to see how 
ordinary thoughts, HOTs, could transfer properties to another existing state. After all, one’s 
thoughts about tables transfer no properties to tables. 
If HOTs are intentional states, and if suitable HOTs are sufficient for experience, then HOT 
theory satisfies the Exhaustion Thesis—and so HOT theory is a kind of representationalism, albeit 
from a HO perspective. Where FO representationalism takes the relevant content that determines 
phenomenal character to be worldly directed, HO representationalism takes it that phenomenal 
consciousness consists in the suitable representation of one’s mind. 
Rosenthal, however, often writes in ways that might seem to deny this characterization. 
Rosenthal has long emphasized that HOTs are themselves typically unconscious states, which engender 
consciousness. After all, if HOTs were invariably conscious, then the view would face a vicious 
regress of requiring yet HO HOTs to make those second-order HOTs conscious. On Rosenthal’s 
view, HOTs themselves are seldom conscious and are conscious only in introspection, when they 
are targeted by third-order HOTs. Rosenthal thus claims that the states that are conscious are, 
properly speaking, the FO states of which we are aware via suitable HOTs, which may often (in 
targetless cases) be merely notional states (e.g., 2005, p. 130; Weisberg 2011a). The claim that 
Rosenthal’s view constitutes a kind of representationalism may thereby seem to confuse the 
(representational) properties of the HOTs, in virtue of which there is experience, with the properties 
of experiences themselves, whatever conscious states they might be. In other words, phenomenal 
consciousness is a feature of the contents of the HOTs. 
But the claim that consciousness can and often is a property of contents or uninstantiated 
notional states strikes some as an odd or even unacceptable consequence of the theory (e.g., Wilberg 
2010, p. 626). In reply, there are two reasonable alternative ways to construe HOT theory’s 
representationalism.  	
4 One can thus understand Rosenthal as denying either that there are qualia or that qualia are necessarily conscious; 
nothing hangs on this choice (see, e.g., Rosenthal 2005, p. 151, fn. 4). 
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First, we might take a page from FO representationalism’s playbook. FO representationalists 
often face a similar difficulty insofar as one might wonder how phenomenal character might consist 
in the suitable representation of perceptible properties, if one can have phenomenal experiences 
even when those perceptible properties are not instantiated, as in cases of hallucination. But as some 
representationalists have proposed, we can simply identify phenomenal character with the relevant 
representations, not the character of their representata. As Lycan (2019) puts it: 
 
A slightly surprising but harmless consequence of the representational view as formulated here is that sensory 
qualities (“qualia” in our strict first-order sense) are not themselves properties of the experiences that present 
them: Sensory qualities are represented properties of represented objects, and so they are only intentionally 
present in experiences. The relevant properties of the experiences are, representing this quality or that. Of 
course, one could shift the meaning slightly and speak of “qualia” as properties of experiences, identifying them 
with representational features, such as the feature of representing this strict-sense sensory quality or that; 
nothing much hangs on this terminological choice (see also, e.g., Chalmers 2010, p. 342). 
 
We might thereby regard suitable HOTs themselves as phenomenally conscious. Since the mental 
states that suitable HOTs represent are themselves mental representations, Brown (2015) calls this 
latter reading of the view the ‘Higher-Order Representation of a Representation’ (“HOROR”) 
theory. This HOROR view may seem to run afoul of the central motivation for HOT theory, the 
TP, insofar as it seemingly holds that there can be phenomenally conscious states of which one is 
unaware—that is, suitable HOTs—but it does not. The TP, as we construe it, is neutral regarding 
what item instantiates consciousness; it holds only that experience occurs when one is suitably aware 
of oneself as being in mental state. And, again, the claim that phenomenal character is a feature of 
representing relevant FO states is simply equivalent to the claim that it is a feature of those 
represented (notional) FO states.  
 Alternatively, if one is reluctant to attach phenomenal consciousness either to notional states 
or to HOTs, then one might follow Berger (2014), who urges that it is the individual, not any state, 
that is phenomenally conscious. Though we often speak of mental states’ being state or 
phenomenally conscious, this is a kind of loose talk. On this view, strictly speaking one is 
phenomenally conscious just in case one has a suitable HOT. Whichever construal of HOT theory 
we embrace, however, the view has the resources to explain consciousness in terms of mental 
representation alone. 
 
3.  Varieties of Representationalism 
Given that there are many distinctions in the literature among kinds of FO representationalism (see, 
e.g., Chalmers 2010, chapter 11), what kind of representationalism does HOT theory constitute?  
First, many distinguish between pure and impure forms of representationalism. Pure 
representationalism is the view that representational contents are all that are required to account for 
phenomenal character. Impure representationalism appeals to factors beyond representational 
content. Most representationalists hold a version of impure representationalism, largely because 
there can be unconscious representation and because the same content may be represented in 
various ways. One can visually represent some content, one can consciously represent it, one can 
doubt it, one can hope it, and so forth.  
 It is reasonable to interpret Rosenthal’s representationalism about consciousness as a kind of 
impure representationalism. On HOT theory, one experiences red because one has a suitable HO 
representation. The ‘suitable’ here indicates that not all HOTs engender consciousness. As 
Rosenthal has argued, suitable HOTs must meet various conditions: they must, for example, assert 
their contents. Doubting that one sees red or wondering whether or not one sees red cannot make 
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one aware of oneself as seeing red—and so does not result in one having a visual experience of red. 
A suitable HOT must assert that one currently sees red. 
 So-called ‘wide’ representationalism, by contrast, is the view that content of the relevant 
representations are determined by their external relations to their representational targets. Narrow 
representationalism is the view that the content of the relevant representations is determined internally. 
This distinction is often illustrated with familiar thought experiments. Suppose, for example, there 
were a community of people who experienced what you would call ‘red’ when they observed grass, 
but who still call it ‘green’. Now compare you looking at a tomato and a member of this hypothetical 
community observing grass. Do you experience the same color or not? Wide representationalists 
hold that you do not have the same experience because your experience represents red, whereas the 
other person’s experience represents green. The experiences have different wide contents. Narrow 
representationalism, by contrast, holds that you both have the same phenomenal character because 
you are in the same internal states. Even though your environments differ, and so even though the 
experiences represent different properties, they have the same narrow contents.  
 Theorists often further distinguish between (wide) Russellian and (narrow) Fregean 
representationalism. A Russellian content is one which involves attributing properties to objects. 
When one experiences red, one’s experience represents the world as instantiating the relevant 
perceptible property. Such a content is Russellian insofar as the conditions under which it would be 
satisfied involve a perceptible property’s being attributed to some object. Most FO 
representationalists hold some kind of impure wide Russellian representationalism (e.g., Dretske 
1995; Tye 2000). But Fregean versions have been explored recently (e.g., Chalmers 2010), wherein 
the relevant contents involve (or just are) modes of presentations.  
Rosenthal’s representationalism about consciousness is reasonably understood as being an 
impure narrow Fregean higher-order representationalism, which should be distinguished from the impure 
wide Russellian higher-order representationalism of the sort defended by some relationalist HOT 
theorists (e.g., Gennaro 2012). Why is the view narrow? On Rosenthal’s nonrelational version of 
HOT theory, since suitable HOTs are sufficient for experience, HOT duplicates are phenomenal 
duplicates. Gennaro’s (2012) so-called ‘wide intrinsicality view’, for example, is thus named to 
emphasize the fact that the content of the HOT includes the FO state itself.  
Explaining why the view is Fregean is a bit more complex. The reason is that HOTs can 
make us aware of our FO states in various ways, which may affect phenomenology. In general, 
Rosenthal has argued that HOTs make one aware of FO states in some, but rarely (if ever) in all 
respects. Consider a visual experience of red. One can be aware of one’s perception as a seeing of 
(generic) red, as a seeing of some specific shade of red, and so on. And on Rosenthal’s view, these 
ways of being aware of one’s perception of red affect what it is like for one. The suitable HOT with 
the content “I see red” engenders a different sort of visual experience than the suitable HOT with 
the content “I see crimson.” It is thus reasonable to take Rosenthal’s view as invoking a kind of 
Fregean content.5  
Understanding HOT theory as a kind of representationalism not only clarifies how the view 
works, but also shows why the view is not susceptible to many objections often leveled against it. 
That consciousness is a representationalist affair, for example, demonstrates why the targetless HOT 
objection is not an issue for the theory. The mental appearances that constitute consciousness are 
straightforwardly explained as intentionally inexistents, in the same way that standard FO 
	
5 This view is plainly not the sort of Fregean representationalism that, for example, Chalmers (2010, p. 363) champions.  
On Chalmers’ complex view, a Fregean content is something of the form <the property that is disposed to cause 
experiences of type T in me>.  For HOT theory, suitable HOTs’ contents are Fregean in this more modest way. 
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representationalists explain hallucination in terms of the intentional inexistence of the objects of 
perception.  
Likewise, more recently some have urged that HOT theory is incapable of explaining certain 
kinds of phenomenology. Gottlieb (2015), for example, argues that standard HOT theory cannot 
explain the so-called ‘presentational phenomenology’ that putatively occurs when perceptually 
experiences seem to make present objects in our environments in a way that conscious thoughts do 
not. Gottlieb urges that since HOTs are ordinary thoughts, they cannot explain this difference in 
kinds of experiences. But as HOT theory is representationalist, it explains the differences among 
experiences not in terms of differences between kinds of HO representations (e.g., thoughts vs. 
perceptual states), but rather in terms of differences in those HO representations’ contents. Presuming 
there is such a thing as presentational phenomenology, it occurs when one is aware of oneself as 
being in states with mental qualities, as opposed, say, to being in states that exhibit only 
nonqualitative intentional content.  
One might, however, worry that such a version of HOT theory denies that experience is 
genuinely qualitative. After all, if the mental qualities that we seem to be aware of in qualitative 
experience may be merely intentionally inexistent, it may seem that there really is no such thing as 
qualitative mentality. But this is a mistake. Once again, as representationalists often maintain, 
qualitative mentality consists in the suitable representation of qualities. On FO views, such qualities are 
the perceptible properties of external objects; on HOT theory, they are the mental qualities of 
perceptual and other states.  
To fully appreciate the precise nature of the contents of such HOTs, however, we must 
explore how Rosenthal conceives of these qualitative mental properties. And it is to that theory of 
mental qualities that we now turn. 
 
4. QST and Representationalism 
Rosenthal is clear that he does not think of mental qualities as mere sensa. If he did, then his view 
would amount to a kind of HO qualia view, in which experience consists in HO awareness of 
oneself as being in states that exhibit nonrepresentational qualitative features. But just as the qualia 
realist’s qualia are often thought to be irreducible or to resist naturalistic explanation, it is unclear 
that there could be a naturalistic explanation of such nonrepresentational mental qualities.  
Since Rosenthal maintains that mental qualities can and do occur without being conscious, 
he argues that our best way to understand them is not in terms of our introspective awareness of 
them, as qualia realists often urge, but in terms of the roles they play in providing us perceptual 
access to perceptible properties. Mental red, for example, seems to be what enables us to tell 
perceptible red apart from the other perceptible colors. Such a theory is thus compatible with mental 
qualities’ enabling sensory discrimination that occurs outside of consciousness in subliminal 
perception. 
Rosenthal observes that each of our sensory modalities provides us access to families of 
perceptible properties—vision enables us to discriminate among the perceptible colors; touch 
among textures; taste among flavors; and so on. As is well known, we can organize what a creature 
can perceptually discriminate via a particular modality into what is known as a ‘quality space’—a  
space of perceptible features organized along various dimensions which reflect the similarity-and-
differences relations between those properties that the creature draws via that modality (e.g., Quine 
1969; Kuehni 2010). The color quality space as discriminated by vision, for example, orders the 
colors such that red is closer to orange than it is to green—and is thought to be ordered along the 
dimensions of hue, saturation, and brightness. 
            To explain how creatures make such perceptual discriminations which are captured by the 
relevant quality spaces, Rosenthal maintains that creatures must be able to be in mental states that 
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vary at least as finely as the properties they discriminate. He thus proposes that we can posit spaces 
of mental qualities that are simply extrapolated from and thereby match their corresponding spaces 
of perceptible properties. Just as there is a space of perceptible colors in which red is closer to 
orange than it is to green, there must be a space of mental colors, in which mental red is closer to 
mental orange than it is to mental green. Since disparate perceptible properties, physically construed, 
may be discriminated as occupying the same locations within the quality spaces (e.g., metamers, or 
color properties with disparate spectral-reflectance profiles that look the same under standard 
viewing conditions), there will be a one-to-many, or homomorphic, mapping of mental qualities to 
perceptible properties, when the latter are described purely physically—and an isomorphic mapping 
when the latter are grouped in respect of discriminability. 
Rosenthal argues that such quality spaces thereby identify and individuate mental qualities. 
Since mental red just is that property of visual states in virtue of which individuals distinguish 
perceptible red from the other perceptible colors, mental red just is the property that occupies a 
location in the space of mental qualities that corresponds to the location of perceptible red in the 
quality space of perceptible colors, from which the former space is simply extrapolated.6  
 Since mental qualities are understood as those properties that enable creatures to 
discriminate their corresponding perceptible properties, it is reasonable to hold, as Rosenthal (e.g., 
2005, p. 208) himself maintains, that mental qualities represent their corresponding perceptible 
properties. The best explanation of how mental red enables one to discriminate the perceptible-color 
red is that the former represents the latter.  
It thus seems that Rosenthal’s view amounts to a kind of representationalism about mental 
qualities as well. But such a representationalism again differs from standard versions of the view. For 
one thing, this is a representationalism about the FO properties of mental states that can be, but 
need not be, conscious—and are conscious only when they are themselves represented by suitable 
HOTs. That is to say, phenomenal character consists in HO representations of FO representations, 
as HOROR theory urges, whereas qualitative character consists in FO representations of perceptible 
properties, which can and do occur unconsciously.  
Another salient difference is that many versions of representationalism explain the nature of 
(FO) perceptual representation in terms of what are often called ‘tracking theories’ of mental 
content (e.g., Dretske 1995; Tye 2000), on which a perceptual state represents a perceptible property 
just in case it stands in the appropriate tracking relation to it; candidates include detecting, carrying 
information about, or causally co-varying under optimal conditions with the property (for a review, 
see Neander, 2006). These versions of so-called ‘tracking representationalism’ are thereby atomistic 
insofar as they hold that a perceptual state’s content, and therefore phenomenal character, depends 
only on its standing in the right kind of one-to-one relation to the relevant perceptible property. It is 
consistent with tracking representationalism that a creature be capable of visually perceiving one 
color only.  
QST, by contrast, explains mental qualities’ representational natures holistically, in terms of 
their relations to one another in quality spaces. That is, Rosenthal’s view would seem to amount to a 
kind of holistic representationalism, which depends on a theory of the content of qualitative states that 
Berger (2018) calls ‘quality-space semantics’ (“QSS”): 
 
	
6 Similar accounts can be told for the other sensory modalities such as touch or smell, perceptual sensations of common 
sensibles such as shape or size, and interoceptive sensations such as pains, tickles, and itches (for an in depth account of 
QST as it applies to olfaction, for example, see, e.g., Young et al 2014). 
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QSS: Qualitative state S represents a perceptible property P of type T iff S occupies a location within the space 
of perceptual states extrapolated from the space of T-type perceptible properties that corresponds to the 
location of P within the space of T-type perceptible properties. 
 
According to QSS, a visual state that exhibits mental red is accurate only if perceptible red is present 
and inaccurate otherwise. QSS thus echoes holistic theories of content such as inferential- or conceptual-
role semantics (“CRS”) (e.g., Sellars 1963). On such views, a thought’s conceptual content depends (at 
least in part) on its inferential connections to other thoughts. The thought that it’s raining represents 
something like the state of affairs that it’s raining because, for example, one is disposed to infer from 
that thought various things (e.g., that one should grab one’s umbrella). Likewise, QSS holds that the 
fact that a mental quality represents a perceptible property constitutively depends on how that 
property would be discriminated from other perceptible properties, as captured by the quality space.  
 
5. Mental Qualities and Mental Content 
Rosenthal, however, seems to reject this reading of his view; he writes:  
 
[T]hough qualitative states represent corresponding perceptible properties, representing by way of 
homomorphisms operates differently from representing by way of intentional content. So homomorphism 
theory doesn’t sustain a representationalist view on which qualitative character is at bottom a matter of 
intentional content (2005, p. 222). 
 
Rosenthal seems to be questioning the idea that his view is representationalist about qualitative 
character, but what is he really highlighting is the fact that mental qualities represent things in a 
different way than ordinary intentional states such as HOTs, doubts, and hopes. This is important. 
But it is not something that representationalists need reject.  
 While some theorists do maintain that all conscious content is conceptual content (e.g., 
McDowell 1994), many representationalists maintain that qualitative states have nonconceptual content, 
however that distinction is drawn (e.g., Dretske 1995; Tye 2000).7 We thus propose that mental 
qualities are the properties of having particular nonconceptual contents—they are modally specific 
ways of representing perceptible properties. Mental red is a mental representation of perceptible red 
that represents it in a distinctively visual way. 
Understanding Rosenthal’s view in this way opens up new vistas for understanding his 
theory and connecting it to related debates. This understanding of mental qualities, for example, 
sheds light on our understanding of nonconceptual content in general. Some theorists have 
distinguished two notions of nonconceptual content (see, e.g., Byrne 2005)—and mental qualities (or 
the qualitative states that have them) are arguably nonconceptual in both ways. According to the state 
conception of nonconceptualism, a creature C is in a mental state M that has state nonconceptual 
content SN just in case it is possible for C to be in M and not possess the concepts that (canonically) 
specify SN. By contrast, according the content conception of nonconceptualism, a creature C is in a 
mental state M that has content nonconceptual content CN just in case it is not possible for CN to 
be the content of a conceptual/cognitive state such as belief.  
	
7 Terminology in this area is unsystematic; as a result, some debates may be without substance. Many, for instance, use 
‘intentional’ and ‘representational’ interchangeably; thus taking ‘representationalism’ and ‘intentionalism’ to name the 
same view (e.g., Byrne 2001). Others reserve ‘intentional content’ for the conceptual or cognitive content of thought—
and thus reserve ‘intentionalism’ for the view that experience is exhaustively cognitive or conceptual (e.g., Tye 2000, p. 
63). This is why we prefer ‘representationalism’ for the view at issue—that experiences’ characters can be explained 
wholly in terms of their representational properties, prescinding from the question of whether or not there are multiple 
kinds of mental representations.     
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Qualitative states are state nonconceptual because the theory posits such (spaces of) 
properties to explain how creatures discriminate among perceptible properties in the first place. 
Without mental qualities, it is unclear how creatures could navigate their environments intelligently 
(cf. Quine 1969, p. 123). As Rosenthal notes, while QST is compatible with creatures’ quality spaces 
being adjusted by learning, biological development, or other processes, they must be to some extent 
inborn. Conceptual contents, by contrast, are likely learned—and arguably learned on the basis of 
navigating one’s environment via states with mental qualities. Creatures thus need not possess 
concepts in order to token mental qualities.   
 Qualitative states are also content nonconceptual. Rosenthal maintains that there are various 
ways in which the contents of thoughts would seem to differ from mental qualities’ representational 
natures: 
 
For one thing, mental qualities cannot be combined to form thoughts with syntactic structure. In addition, 
intentional states have characteristic mental attitudes, such as mental assertion, doubt, wondering, and so forth, 
and there is nothing in perceiving that corresponds to mental attitude or even holds any hope for explaining it. 
And though mental qualities do arguably represent the perceptible properties that correspond to them (e.g. 
Berger manuscript; Lewis 1972, 257; Rosenthal 2005, chs. 5-7, 2011), the way they represent is unlike that of 
intentional states. Intentional states represent truth-evaluable units, such as states of affairs; by contrast, the 
impressions and ideas that Hume's view accommodates simply represent perceptible properties, which are not 
truth evaluable (2012, p. 24).  
 
On Rosenthal’s view, mental red represents perceptible red in a way that cannot be combined with 
other mental representations to form thoughts in the way that the concept RED can. Consequently, 
qualitative states do not and cannot stand in inferential relations to one another or to other states in 
virtue of their mental qualities. Though mental red is more similar to mental orange than mental 
green, one cannot infer anything from mental red. Mental red does not imply, for example, some 
mental equivalent to nongreen. Indeed, as Rosenthal observes (e.g. 2012, p. 24, fn. 3), mental red can 
inaccurately represent red even if no red is present, but it cannot represent red as not present. One 
can, of course, infer something from the thought that one’s perceptual state exhibits mental red, and 
one’s thought can be true or false, but that is because the thought has the conceptual content that 
one has a reddish sensation. If one never has perceptual states that exhibit both mental red and 
mental green at the same mental location, it is because of the nature of those mental colors, not 
because of some inferential relation that holds between them. Since it is often held that the mark of 
conceptual states such as belief is that they stand in inferential relations, it is clear that mental 
qualities are not the kinds of contents that could be the contents of belief.  
One might, however, object that Rosenthal’s view does not count as a version of 
representationalism because mental qualities are not genuinely representations, as they fail to meet 
more specific criteria for representatationhood. Some, for example, maintain that there can be no 
representation without attribution or representation as (e.g., Burge 2010, p. 249). It might seem, 
then, that the mental qualities involve at best a weaker kind of relation to perceptible properties, 
such as merely detecting or carrying information about them. On this view, mental red might detect 
or carry information about red, but it does not genuinely represent it.  
 But while thought often or always involves attribution of properties to objects, it is unclear 
why qualitative representation must involve attribution. One might worry that if a state does not 
represent objects’ as having properties, then there can be no misrepresentation. But this is not the 
case. QSS holds that if a mental quality represents red, then that representation is accurate only if red 
is present. Moreover, however we describe what mental qualities do, they are quite unlike other 
merely information-carrying states such as states of one’s retina. States of the retina detect edges, but 
we may not want to call them representational; they are, to use Dennett’s (1969) expression, merely 
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subpersonal states. But unlike such states, qualitative states are personal-level and can be and often are 
conscious. Moreover, they are richly integrated into our mental lives—perceptual states, for 
example, typically cause downstream perceptual thoughts about what one perceives. We must thus 
be careful to distinguish the information-carrying role of subpersonal states (such as states of the 
retina) from the function of personal-level representational mental qualities. 
Rosenthal nonetheless rejects characterizing his view as representationalist. Again discussing 
Shoemaker’s and Harman’s versions of representationalism, he writes: 
 
On Shoemaker’s version of representationalism, the properties of qualitative states that we introspect are 
intentional, but that’s not the case on the present account. We introspect qualitative properties as well. And, 
contrary to Harman’s representationalist claim, we are conscious not only of the redness of the tomato, but of 
the mental qualities of our experience of the tomato. The HO states in virtue of which we are aware of such 
qualitative states are themselves intentional states; they are HOTs. But that doesn’t sustain the 
representationalism put forth by Shoemaker or Harman (2005, p. 223). 
 
If we understand Rosenthal’s point, it is that the combination of QST and HOT theory is not 
representationalist because, when we introspect our perceptual experiences, we can be and often are 
aware not only of the perceptible qualities of objects in the world—such as perceptible colors—but 
also of the mental qualities of the perceptual experiences themselves.  
 Rosenthal’s view does seem to cut against a claim that many representationalists do make—
what is often known as the ‘transparency’ intuition or claim—that holds that the only qualities that 
we are ever aware of in experience are the qualities of objects that we sense or perceive there to be, 
not any qualities of those sensory or perceptual states themselves (e.g., Harman 1990; Tye 2000).8   
 But the transparency claim is, as many claims about introspection are, controversial. And 
whether or not experience is transparent, rejecting the putative transparency of perceptual 
experience does not entail that one rejects representationalism (indeed, not even all 
representationalists accept it; see, e.g., Chalmers 2010, p. 368). Although Rosenthal seems to build 
the transparency claim into his characterization of representationalism, we take the claim only to 
form the backbone of an argument for the view (e.g., Harman 1990; Tye 2000). Perhaps the main, or 
even only, reason to think that there are nonrepresentational properties of experience—qualia—is 
that such qualities are often thought to be available to introspection. But if (as the transparency 
claim has it) there are no such qualities available to introspection—if we are only aware of what 
experiences represent, not the experiences themselves—then it would seem that the best explanation 
is that there are no such mental qualities and that experience is exhaustively representational, as 
representationalism claims.  
 But it remains open that there could be a variety of representationalism that does not require 
experience to be transparent. And Rosenthal’s view can be interpreted as holding that introspection 
may not seem transparent insofar as we can be aware introspectively of mental qualities as such—that 
is, not as representing anything—when in fact they do represent perceptible properties. 
Introspection is not transparent, but perception does not exhibit any (metaphysically) 
nonrepresentational features. And this, we maintain, is compatible with representationalism.  
A fruitful consequence of our interpretation of Rosenthal’s view is that it delivers what we 
might regard as a kind of pseudo-transparency. Since mental red is a distinctively visual (nonconceptual) 
way of representing perceptible red, the content of the suitable HOT that engenders a visual 
experience of red may be rendered as something like “I am aware of perceptible red in a distinctively 
visual way” (see, e.g., Rosenthal 2005, p. 123). There is thus a kind of awareness of external objects 
and properties represented in perceptual experience, though such awareness is oblique and an actual 	
8 For an interesting discussion of whether or not Rosenthal’s view can reject the transparency claim, see Gottlieb (2016). 
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awareness of those objects and properties plays no role in determining the character of perceptual 
experience.9    
 We hazard that Rosenthal’s reluctance to endorse transparency and the representationalism it 
often brings in tow stems from a worry about eliminativism about mental qualities (see, e.g., 2019, p. 
54). And it is true that most representationalists are phenomenal externalists insofar as they hold that the 
only qualities that exist are the qualities of external objects that we perceptually represent there to be 
(e.g., Harman 1990; Tye 2000). But this is because representationalists and qualia realists alike often 
assume that if there were mental qualities, they would be nonrepresentational qualia. Many assume 
that affording mental properties any representational role entails that such properties are not 
genuinely qualitative.   
Some qualia realists do propose that qualia are representational, but in a defanged fashion 
that is understandably objectionable to representationalists. Block (e.g., 2007), for example, claims 
that some qualia are mental paint insofar as they may function to represent perceptible properties, 
akin to the way in which colored paint may function to represent colors. But it is not part of mental 
paint’s nature to be representational—and Block maintains that the very same mental paint may 
represent different perceptible colors for different individuals, as in cases of undetectable quality 
inversion. Unsurprisingly, representationalists deny there are such properties (see, e.g., Harman 
1990).  
We may regard Rosenthal as defending a compromise between qualia views and 
representationalism. On Rosenthal’s view, undetectable quality inversion is impossible; mental 
qualities represent their particular corresponding perceptible properties only—and thus any 
difference in how individuals perceive things is in principle detectable. We can thereby reject the 
(unfounded) insistence that we are never aware mental qualities without endorsing a view that 
admits (problematic) nonrepresentational qualia. We may distinguish two kinds of qualities—the 
mental and the perceptible—and hold that the former genuinely represent the latter.  
In a recent paper, Rosenthal seems to resist even this reading of his view; he writes: 
 
Quality-space theory defines a representational role for mental qualities. But quality-space theory is not a type 
of representationalism. Mental qualities are the distinguishing mental properties of perceptual states, and are 
independent of any representational role. We taxonomize and individuate qualitative states and explain their 
nature not by appeal to their representational role, but their role in perceptual discrimination. Indeed, the only 
sound reason for taking mental qualities to represent stimulus properties is the role they play in perceptual 
discrimination. Discriminative role forges the tie mental qualities have to stimulus properties, and mental 
qualities represent only because of that tie (2019, p. 54). 
 
But there are reasons to question Rosenthal’s argument here. First, as noted in the Introduction, 
representationalism is independently attractive. Second, arguably the best explanation of mental 
qualities’ roles in perceptual discrimination is that they represent their corresponding perceptible 
properties. And, third, even if we can understand mental qualities without adverting to their 
representational characters, we expect that Rosenthal would agree that mental qualities cannot vary 
independently of their corresponding nonconceptual contents.  
Does this view thereby amount to a kind of representationalism? The issue is delicate—and 
perhaps does depend on how one wishes to use ‘representationalism’. The view proposed here does 
acknowledge that mental qualities have, as it were, a life independent of content. But 
representationalism is often cast as the supervenience thesis that the character of experience 
supervenes on its representational content (e.g., Byrne 2001)—and Rosenthal’s view does seem at 	
9 One could thus maintain there is a kind of Russellian content associated with perceptual experiences that involves the 
physical object in one’s environment and its properties, though this content does not determine phenomenal character.  
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least to meet this characterization. Even if Rosenthal is correct that mental qualities are not identical 
with mental representations, it would seem open to hold that mental contents supervene on mental 
qualities and vice versa. In other words, Rosenthal’s view would seem to satisfy the Exhaustion Thesis 
suitably reframed not in terms of phenomenal character (which we take to involve consciousness), 
but in terms of qualitative character. On that reading of the thesis, for every qualitative character Q 
there is some content C such that a state with Q is nothing more than a qualitative state with 
content C. As we understand Rosenthal’s view, a qualitative state just is a state that enables 
discrimination—and in that way has a particular content.10 
 
6. Conclusions 
Rosenthal’s views seem to constitute a unique and especially promising version of 
representationalism. On the combination of HOT theory and QST, qualitative experience occurs 
when one is aware of oneself as being in states with mental qualities. And we have argued that 
mental qualities are best construed as having a kind of nonconceptual content, though one need not 
in experience be aware of those qualities as representations. So where does this leave us? In short, 
experiences are determined by being in conceptual states—a suitable HOTs—and consist in 
conceptualized states with nonconceptual contents that need not be conceptualized as having contents. This is 
Rosenthal’s representationalism.11 
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